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NIMBY, taxe fonci ere et vote par les pieds

Abstract : A community of individuals heterogeneous in terms of revenue occupies a territory subdivided into zones characterized by unequal levels of amenities. Starting from the concept of land rent a la Ricardo, we propose a model determining the bid rents in the diff erent zones as well as the distribution of the population among these. We then study the impact of a shock a ffecting negatively the amenities in one zone on the rents of the other zones via a process of "voting with the feet" a la Tiebout. Starting from this analysis, we propose a taxation of land rent that allows for a compensation of the residents whose neighborhood is directly a ffected by the amenity shock by the other members of the community. Such is system may prevent NIMBY attitudes. Moreover, as far as rent is observable, the mechanism has the advantage of having no preference revelation problem.
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Submitted on : Monday, June 16, 2014 - 3:32:09 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, February 21, 2019 - 11:02:54 AM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Tuesday, September 16, 2014 - 11:26:52 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01006700, version 1



Marc Germain, Dominique Peeters. NIMBY, taxe fonci ere et vote par les pieds. 2013. ⟨hal-01006700⟩



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