Ghost Stories, The Sublime and Fantastic Thirds in Kant and Kleist
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Thomas Strack: From Fools to Explorers: Seventeenth-Century Revisions of the Christian View on Travel ........................................ 205
Thomas Dutoit: Ghost Stories, the Sublime and Fantastic Thirds in Kant and Kleist ......................................................... 225
Sigrid Lange: Topographische Irritationen. Frauenliteratur nach dem Ende der DDR ...................................................... 255

Besprechungen / Reviews ............................................................... 275

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Both eighteenth century philosophy and twentieth century theory have addressed the question of ghosts, ghost stories, and parapsychological phenomena in order to raise a similar question: how is it possible to think that which is beyond reason, beyond experience, that which cannot be grasped? In the eighteenth century, it is through the notion of negative presentation that Immanuel Kant conceptualized the possibility of presenting the fact that there «are» unpresentables, that «something» is beyond presentation. «Sublime» is the name of this negative presentation within the realm of philosophical aesthetics (in the «Analytik des Erhabenen» [1795]); Geist is its name in the realm of «parapsychological phenomena» (in the Träume eines Geistersehers [1766]). The sublime and Geist are both names for the negative presentation of «something» beyond experience. A third term, the schema, which Kant developed between these two others (in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft [1781]) and explicitly called a «third», names the mode of presentation that mediates between what is within and what is beyond experience. It serves as relay between Kant's early analysis of the supernatural realm of Geist and his late analysis of the natural realm of the sublime.

In the twentieth century Tzvetan Todorov's study of the fantastic as a literary genre (The Fantastic), which describes late eighteenth and nineteenth century popular culture fiction, is an attempt to name with the term «fantastic» an experience of fundamental uncertainty relative to an event that can be neither grasped according to a law, natural or supernatural, nor to a genre, uncanny or marvelous. The fantastic would be the name for the limit between rational and irrational ways of knowing, a limit that is neither the one nor the other. Insofar as the problematic of the «fantastic» is that of «a feeling» of indecision or hesitation about the status of an event which can neither be grasped as supernatural nor as natural, and which cannot be explained either marvelously or rationally, then fundamental to it is a negative manner of perception, presentation, or, as Todorov puts it, negative reading. As negative presentation, the fantastic functions analogously to Kant's sublime and Geist. As middle term and «third genre» between the natural, i.e., uncanny, and the supernatural, i.e., marvelous, the fantastic shares the key feature of Kant's mediating schema.
Among such parallelisms as sublime/Geist, natural/supernatural, where mediation imposes itself as «third» in terms of the schema or the fantastic, Heinrich von Kleist may be read, as «third,» between the philosopher (Kant) and the literary theorist (Todorov). Indeed, «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» can be read in terms of both the sublime/Geist and natural/supernatural pairs, in a way that dramatizes the fantastic as well as the schema. It is a story relying on a seemingly supernatural phenomenon. Diegetically, a marquise acts as hostess, receiving into her castle a beggarwoman, as guest, whom she lodges in one of its rooms. The owner of the castle, the host, a marquis, later enters the room, and orders the beggarwoman to get up from her bed in the corner of the room and to go across the room behind the oven. The beggarwoman obeys, but collapses and dies upon reaching her destination. The marquis is witness to the death of the guest. Thereafter, what seems to be a ghost in the castle leads to the destruction of the host and his castle. In terms of the structure of this short four paragraph text, «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» can be read as the story of a line that, in the first paragraph, is traced by the beggarwoman who walks across a room and dies, and then, in the remaining three paragraphs, of the four repetitions of this linear movement by an un-graspable noise.⁴

The present paper is a reading of Kant, Todorov, and Kleist that aims at analyzing the notion of negative presentation as it is developed under the terms of «sublime,» Geist (Kant), fantastic (Todorov), and «unbegreifliches Geräusch» (Kleist) in order to establish the links among them. Kleist has already been read in terms of Kant's sublime and in terms of the fantastic genre. As Werner Hamacher has convincingly demonstrated around the topos of the earthquake in Kleist's «Erdbeben in Chili» and in Kant's sublime, Kleist's work echoes what Immanuel Kant, in the sublime, calls negative presentation.⁵ In line with Hamacher's argument, this essay develops the status of negative presentation in Kleist and in Kant. However, focusing on Kleist's only «ghost story,» I am not simply shifting the topos of Hamacher's analysis. Rather, I want to stress the relation between the analysis of the sublime and the thinking of Geist (ghosts, spirits) - both in Kleist and Kant. Furthermore, while Petra Perry has already established Kleist's stories as particular «examples» of the «fantastic genre,» my purpose here will not be to typologize «Das Bettelweib» as one more «example.» Instead, it is the relation between Kant's negative presentation and Todorov's negative perception that I hope to elucidate by reading them together with Kleist's story. Rather than applying Todorov's notion of the fantastic to Kleist's story for the sake of typology, I want to stress that Kleist's text is about an unclassifiable liminal moment – of which
the «fantastic» is one name among others – structured by negative presentation.

Indeed, «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» foregrounds negative presentation and negative perception in a number of ways. First, vision is negated when the «strange» event happens: «dieser Vorfall, der ausserordentliches Aufsehen machte» (9). The repeated sounds of falling are associated with a gesture (Aufsehen) that is obviously a lack of vision since nobody sees anything, despite this gesture being called an Aufsehen. The prolapse (Vorfall) of that which «kein Mensch mit Augen sehen kann» (16) indicates an «ausserordentliches Aufsehen» precisely because the seeing (Sehen) is beyond the order (ausserordentlich) of seeing, beyond vision («jemand, den kein Mensch mit Augen sehen kann»). The Vorfall remains a case before the characters, befalling before them without however belonging to the order of the visual. When vision is negated, only sound is left. As Hermann Davids writes, the noise made by the movement is «unsichtbar, nur gehört» and «wirkt nicht optisch, sondern akustisch» (83). Davids even hears the story as a «wortmusikalische Komposition» in which Kleist attempted, «poetischen Gedanken in Bachscher Art zu fugieren» (85). Indeed, the Marquis’s command that the beggarwoman go behind the oven («sich hinter den Ofen ... verfügen» [2]) unleashes a fugue of sounds, turning the castle room into an echo-chamber: when the beggarwoman disappears from the story after the first paragraph, what replaces her in the story is noise, the four times repeated «Geräusch» (6, 11, 13, 16). Second, the «content» of the noise is negated and it only functions as a signal that something happens. There is clearly a noise and for many readers it has been readily associated with the guest/beggarwoman whom the Marquis hospitably welcomed in the first paragraph, turning the story into a «ghost story.» However, such a reading, which might stem from the desire to fall back onto classified categories (and that of the «ghost story» is one), reduces the indeterminacy which is the crux of the story. I shall argue that what is presented in «Das Bettelweib» is less the supernatural as such (less a ghost story) than the interval between the supernatural and the natural, between the intelligible and sensible, between the concept (Begriff) and the image (Bild). These pairs structure Western thought. They also structure the «inconceivable» and «invisible» noise. As we shall see, these «ghostly» noises are presented negatively (no ghost is ever seen), in terms of the sublime (lexically and structurally), and even mediated by what is explicitly called a «third» («etwas Drittes»).

While for Kant the sublime is a philosophical term, he explicitly excludes from philosophical debates proper the question of whether it is possible to
conceive and represent the dead, the spiritual, or ghosts. Indeed, the possibility of conceiving and representing the dead, the spiritual, in the form of ghost stories occasioned Kant, some thirty-four years prior to his «Analytik des Erhabenen» and three years after his Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, to write a short book, which is in part a review, on Immanuel Swedenborg, Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch die Träume der Metaphysik (TG). Here, Kant sees metaphysics as a science devoted to exploring the limit of human reason. Philosophical investigation is especially aware of its own limit: «Wenn diese Nachforschung aber in Philosophie ausschlägt ..., so ziehen sich die Grenzen enger zusammen, und die Marksteine werden gelegt, welche die Nachforschung aus eigentümlichen Bezirke niemals mehr ausschweifen lassen» (TG 985). This limit is that between the physical and the spiritual, or ghostly, world: there is a fundamental and unbreachable difference between the world of Geist (the world of spiritual beings that are not part of the natural, physical world and its laws) and the realm of reason which is a product, an effect, of the natural world. Although the concept of Geist is commonly treated everyday, philosophy unmasks these common insights as illusory, further emphasizing the limits to what can be known: «etwas mehr Philosophie entfernet dieses Schattenbild der Einsicht noch mehr, und überzeugt uns, daß es gänzlich außer dem Gesichtskreise der Menschen liege» (TG 985). When discussing the concept of ghosts, philosophy must work within its own limits, within the limit of human reason. On the question of ghosts, «das Geschäfte der Philosophie hat ein Ende» for it is impossible for reason to say how something that would not be part of the natural world could be a pure cause or force without having been itself an effect, that is, already a part, of the natural world.

New foundations of cause and effect would have to be assumed in order to conceive of Geist within the realm of reason. Yet since there is no way to determine the condition of possibility of such new foundations, one can only discuss Geist outside the realm of reason and philosophy, that is, as fiction: «alle solche Urteile, wie diejenige von der Art, wie meine Seele den Körper bewegt, oder mit andern Wesen ihrer Art jetzt oder künftig in Verhältnis steht, können niemals etwas mehr als Erdichtungen sein» (TG 986). One can only poeticize (dichten), either «schöpferisch oder chimärisch,» about «neue Fundamentalverhältnisse von Ursache und Wirkung» (TG 987). Philosophy can describe the difficulties inherent in thinking of a world of spirits or ghosts, but the description of such a world belongs to the realm of supposition and fiction. Kant, as philosopher, bans spirits/ghosts from the philosophy. They «belong» to Erdichtung, to «fiction» (Erdichtung translates the Latin fictio).
Ghost Stories

However, Träume eines Geistersehers is not only a response to what Kant considers to be Swedenborg’s fictions about ghosts, but it is also a response to what was happening in what Kant calls the “academies,” namely the fact that philosophers acted as if they knew what Geist means. Kant names Christian August Crusius in particular in Träume eines Geistersehers: he is one of those philosophers in the academy who make Geist part of reason (TG 925).

Against Crusius and the “newer philosophers’” definition of the word Geist as simply a being that has reason, that thinks and wants, Kant points out that such a definition of Geist is a “self-deception” because under the guise of answering what Geist is, it simply conflates Geist with reason (TG 925). For Kant, Geist has nothing to do with reason; instead, it is a fictional product (but this does not make it uninteresting, impossible, or simply a curiosity). Yet Geist is the principle of life, “das Principium dieses Lebens, d.i., die geistige Natur.” Since Geist or the “principium of life,” is a product of fiction (Erdichtung), this makes the “principle of life” (spirit) secondary to fiction, and fiction the principium of the “principium” (TG 963). Therefore, the “principle of life” is first and ultimately formulated in fiction. This inversion confers upon fiction a status that is not simply secondary and derivative, neither to Geiste nor to reason. Fiction (Erdichtung) for Kant is ultimately very important because it is the “best” evidence of Geist, even though it is at the same time part and parcel with “gossip” (allgemeine[m] Gerüchte, TG 967) and other base forms of nonsensical, ungrounded discourses ( Wahrsagerei, Märchen, Spielwerke birnloser Vernünftiger, Phantasterei und Traumdeutung).

By being excluded from philosophical, academic, high discourse and relegated to fictional, popular, low discourse, Geist allows philosophy to define itself. Put beneath philosophy, Geist nevertheless supports it. Kant’s Träume eines Geistersehers locates itself between “spirit” as it is discussed among the “academics” and “ghost” as it is narrated by story-tellers and yarn spinners (accordingly, during the composition of his text, Kant was “only” a sublibrarian at the Royal Palace Library, having himself refused to be considered for the chair of poetry at the University of Berlin in 1764). The first, “spirit,” constitutes the “academic” scene of philosophy; the second, “ghost,” does not belong to it. This is why, despite Frank Sewall’s claim, in the preface to the English translation of Kant’s text, Geist cannot be translated either only by “spirit” or only by “ghost,” although it can be translated by both terms.

Kant’s own “understanding” of Geist is therefore in an ambivalent position, a position that Kant explicitly calls “undecided.” Indeed, Kant’s “Schluß der Theorie von Geistern” (TG 963) is: “Unwissenheit macht auch, daß ich mich nicht unterstehe, so gänzlich alle Wahrheit an den mancherlei Geistererzählungen abzuleugnen” (TG 962). Hence, even though “dem Leser bleibt
das Urteil frei» (TG 963), Kant, as rigorous philosopher, keeps himself «bei Anhörung der mancherlei befremdlichen Erzählungen dieser Art ernsthaft und unentschieden» (TG 963). Kant links this indecisiveness of the status of Geist to the complicated logic of possibility opened up by supposition and Erdichtung. Whereas the Crusian definition links Geist and Vernunft, according to Kant Geist would be that which is produced precisely not by Vernunft, but instead by Vermutung (supposition) and Erdichtung. Geist is not known but vermutet (TG 963). This vermutete Art Wesen, i.e., Geist, can only be thought through Verneinungen. Even the possibility of such negations originates, so to speak, in fiction (TG 963—64). Supposition (through negation) opens up what Kant refers to as the Möglichkeit der geistigen Welt, a possibility which lies precisely in Erdichtung.

Moreover, when Kant responded to Moses Mendelssohn’s review of Träume eines Geistersebers, he addressed specifically the question of this enigmatic possibility: it was precisely what he had tried to grasp in Swedenborg’s «Träumereien.» The point behind his Träume eines Geistersebers, Kant wrote Mendelssohn, was actually to discern the Kräfte geistiger Substanzen but only in an a priori way and through judgments of reason. Such an investigation, he added, dissolved into figuring out whether one could invent such energies through rational means: «ob man nämlich eine primitive Kraft d.i. die erste Grundverhältnis der Ursache zur Wirkung durch Vernunftschlüsse erfinden könne» (B 72). Yet this possibility of invention of the primitive energy is impossible in the order of reason and can only exist in another order which is the order of fiction: «da ich gewiß bin daß dieses [the invention of the primitive energy by reason] unmöglich sey so folget, wenn mir diese Kräfte nicht in der Erfahrung gegeben seyn, daß sie nur erdichtet werden können» (B 72).

Fiction thus testifies to the impossibility of conceiving the powers of Geist through rational means and of presenting any proof of possibility of Geist. However, at the same time, fiction opens up a possibility for thinking which comes from the impossibility to present any proof of the impossibility of thinking Geist. As Kant puts it: «diese Erdichtung aber (fictio heuristica, hypothesis) kann niemals auch nur einen Beweis der Möglichkeit zulassen und die Denklichkeit (deren Schein daher kommt daß sich auch keine Unmöglichkeit davon darthun läßt) ist ein bloßes Blendwerk wie ich denn die Träumereyen des Schwedenbergs selbst, wenn jemand ihre Möglichkeit angriffe, mir zu vertheidigen getraute» (B 72). A complicated logic of (im)possibility is at play here. There is no possibility of conceiving these energies of Geist by means of reason or experience. They belong to fiction, which, albeit a Schein, is nonetheless an appearance of thinkability. For Kant, fictio is not the appear-
ance of the thought itself, i.e., it is not the possibility of the thought, because the appearance admits «not one proof» of possibility. However, such thinkability also testifies to a lack of impossibility: the impossibility of an ability of thinking of spirits or ghosts can therefore not be demonstrated. Thus, **Erdichtung**, the only way of thinking *geist*, is neither a possible nor an impossible way: it is not a possibility of possibility (it does not make possible the possibility of a priori thought of *geist*), but it is also not a possibility of impossibility (it does not make possible the impossibility of presentations, appearances, of *geist*).

The ghost story — *fictio*, *Erdichtung*, and *Vermutung* — cannot be destroyed by philosophy, for philosophy would overstep its bounds were it to try to do so; it cannot, however, serve as the basis for the construction of a priori, rational judgments about a spiritual/ghostly subject, since the story corresponds to nothing in experience, and is therefore not «vermutet[...]. nach der Regel der Analogie» (TG 946). Nonetheless, the ghost-stories are a feature of experience. They are told and they embarrass philosophers badly: «Die Philosophie... siehet sich an den Anlass gewisser Erzählungen, in schlimmer Verlegenheit» (TG 965). By calling them «negations,» philosophy rides itself of such embarrassing stories, yet gradually incorporates them as «negative presentation.»

Although it precedes by thirty-four years the «Analytic of the Sublime,» where Kant elaborates the notion of «negative presentation,» *Träume eines Geistersebers* thus already sets the concept of negative presentation in place through the notion of *fictio*. Not only, as we have seen, can *geist* only be thought through negations: *fictio* or *Erdichtung* founds this «negative Verstand» or «Verneinung» (TG 963), that is, this impossible possibility in which Kant recognizes the «most unknown and at the same time most important task of metaphysics» (TG 983). As Hamacher has shown, the sublime consists precisely in a fundamentally negative sensation. Imagination fails to present raw nature, but imagination also interprets this failed presentation, this negative presentation, as the failure of presentation of an Idea, the Idea being always, in Kant, unpresentable. Indeed, for Kant the presentation that accompanies the feeling of the sublime is «bloß negativ» because the inscrutability of the Idea of the unbounded itself blocks all positive presentation: it «schneidet aller positiven Darstellung gänzlich den Weg ab» (Kritik der Urteilskraft [KdU] 122–23). The presentation that is incommensurable with raw nature becomes a presentation of the incommensurability of every presentation of an Idea. In this turn, imagination refers to itself negatively: a presentation of a negative refers to a negated presentation. This split or difference within imagination between incommensurable presentation and presentation
of incommensurability is the difference of presentation with itself; it is at the limit, deferring and differing negative presentation from the presentation of negative presentation. The sublime feeling consists in an oscillation in imagination between, on the one hand, interpreting its failure to present adequately the radically other («raw nature» or the «Idea») as a fact of human nature and, on the other, transforming such failure into a negative awareness of a supersensible faculty. Both Geist and the sublime are thus structurally constituted through negative presentation.

Furthermore, just as I have argued that Geist constitutes philosophy from which Kant nonetheless bans it, it has been shown that the sublime represents a breakdown of philosophy of which Kant’s oeuvre is explicitly a part. The *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, in which the first, «aesthetic» part includes the «Analytik des Erhabenen,» represents Kant’s effort to reconcile nature and liberty, that is, to unify philosophy. However, the sublime feeling does not belong to the aesthetic traditionally understood (art, the beautiful, form); it is a «mere appendix.» For Derrida, the interest of the sublime consists in how it problematizes presentation through the notion of the limit of presentation: «the presence of a limit is what gives form to the beautiful. The sublime is to be found ... in an «object without form» and the «without-limit» is «represented» in it» («Parergon» 127). As Jean-Luc Nancy states, «form or contour is limitation. Such form, contour or limitation is an issue of the beautiful: the unlimited, on the contrary, is an issue of the sublime. ... The unlimited as such [however] takes off from the border of the limit» (Du sublime 51). To understand the sublime as a presentation of the unlimited, of the infinite presented as such, is to misunderstand the «Analytik des Erhabenen,» for the sublime would be the extreme border between the limited and the unlimited. In the «Analytik des Erhabenen» what Kant calls a «bloße negative Darstellung» is articulated precisely in terms of limits: it guards against «über alle Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit hinaus etwas sehen ... zu wollen» (KdU 123). Jean-François Lyotard argues that the sublime, the experience of the limit engendered through «negative presentation,» represents a breakdown in Kant’s philosophy: «the Analytic of the Sublime» is negative because ... it contains within itself the promise of the disappearance of aesthetics. ... The violence of the sublime is like lightning. It short-circuits thinking with itself. ... The teleological machine explodes» (Leçons 73–74). Ghost stories and parapsychological phenomena are both excluded from philosophy and constitutive of it because they testify to negative presentation; similarly, the sublime, characterized by «negative presentation,» is both constitutive of philosophy and represents its breakdown.

Kant’s position on fiction and ghost stories (as complex impossible possibility) is echoed by Todorov’s on literature-as-fantastic. Although Todorov as
a literary critic uses the term «fantastic» to describe a specific literary genre in a typology of genres (The Fantastic), he is rapidly led to note that the fantastic cannot be conceived as a stable genre, such as the genres of the «uncanny» or the «marvelous.» Rather, he argues, as the middle, third (non)genre, the fantastic is what never becomes a genre, what never can be grouped under a general rule, but, at the same time, the fantastic is the law of genre insofar as it is the moment of indecision («negative reading») necessary and prior to any decision as to the generic status of a text. In fact, Todorov sees the status of all literature after Kafka and Blanchot as «fantastic,» insofar as this «status» consists in a destruction of the opposition between reality and non-reality, the real and the imaginary: «By the hesitation that it engenders, the fantastic questions precisely the existence of an irreducible opposition between the real and unreal.» The fantastic «is that which, within language, destroys the metaphysics inherent in all language» (167). Thus, after remarking that the essence of literature is fantastic, Todorov concludes The Fantastic:

- Literature can be possible only insofar as it makes itself impossible. Either what we say is actually here, in which case there is no room for literature; or else there is room for literature, in which case there is no longer anything to say. As Blanchot writes in La Part du feu: «If language, and in particular literary language, were not constantly advancing towards its death, it would not be possible, for it is this movement towards its impossibility which is its condition and its basis.» The operation which consists of reconciling the possible with the impossible accurately illustrates the word impossible itself. And yet literature exists; that is its greatest paradox. (175)

- Literature is thus the paradoxical possibility of its impossibility.
- The fantastic (hence literature), for Todorov, is the principle of a limit; negative perception, the fantastic, constitutes a liminal moment:

  - The fantastic ... seems located on the frontier of two genres, the marvelous and the uncanny, rather than being an autonomous genre. ... The fantastic in its pure state is represented here by the median line separating the fantastic-uncanny from the fantastic-marvelous. This line corresponds perfectly to the nature of the fantastic, a frontier between two adjacent realms. (44)

- While what is stake in Kant’s banning the «parapsychological» from philosophy is precisely the negative presentation of a liminal experience constitutive of the sublime, Todorov’s fantastic raises the question of an experience of the limit in terms of negative perception or reading.

- This experience of the limit is relevant to the line traced by the noise in Kleist’s «Das Bettelweib von Locarno,» not only because the noise is, as I
shall develop, an event that is fundamentally ungraspable and undecidable within the story (which links it to the fantastic) and because the noise is lexically and structurally associated with the sublime («es erhob sich»), but also because what constitutes the story is a liminal experience (the return of something that had been «banned» and that comes back as a «gespenstartige Geräusch» [12]) in which the limit consists in the line traced by the noise. Such a line can be read, I will argue, as that between the sensible and the supersensible worlds, between the finite world and the infinite world, between the bodily and spiritual worlds, the living and «dead» world, and ultimately between the sublime and the parapsychological. This line can be called «fantastic»: «this line corresponds perfectly to the nature of the fantastic, a frontier between two adjacent realms» (Todorov 44).

If the fact that something happened is certain to the Marquis for whom the «event» is an «unbegreifliche[s] Geräusch» (11), what happens is not. Indeed, the Marquis is terrified when the Florentine knight, a potential buyer of the castle who comes to visit it, assures him, «daß es in dem Zimmer spucke» (6). He feels horror but without knowing why: «Der Marchese erschrocken, er wußte selbst nicht recht warum» (7). The feeling testifies to the Marquis' awareness that something has happened but the reason for the feeling, the explanation of what happened, remains unknown, «invisible» and heard only in a «noise.» The «event» of the four times repeated noise is never diegetically linked to the beggarwoman: in the second part of the text, the Marquis never refers to the beggarwoman of the first part or ascribes the noise to her; moreover, unlike the beggarwoman, the noise seems to have a grammatically masculine agent: «das entsetzliche Geräusch läßt sich wieder hören; jemand ... hebt sich ... empor; man hört das Stroh, das unter ihm rauscht» (16). The indecisiveness concerning the noise is reinforced by the fact that none of the characters links it to the beggarwoman or to any other cause. They all feel the need to investigate it («er ... beschloß, die Sache in der nächsten Nacht selbst zu untersuchen ... um der Sache auf den Grund zu kommen» [14]), although their investigation is not successful. Insofar as they remain incapable of finding an explanation or a cause for this event («dem Vorfall irgendeine gleichgültige und zufällige Ursache ... unterzuschreiben» [13]), the undecidability remains. However, while at the diegetic level (that of the characters) there is no explicit link made between the noise as effect and the beggarwoman as cause, at the textual level (that of the narrator) the link is strongly suggested. In the second paragraph the narrator stresses the relation between what happened in the first paragraph and what follows: «in dem obernähnten ... Zimmer» (5); and the text's last phrase, «in dem Winkel des Zimmers, von welchem er das Bettelweib von Locarno hatte aufstehen heissen» (20), explicitly
names the beggarwoman of the first paragraph, who had disappeared from the diegesis and from the characters’ discourse after the opening paragraph. There is a rupture between the diegesis and text, between the characters’ memory and the textual memory.

The problematic status of the genre of the story (its not so evident status as ghost story) stems precisely from this rupture. Indeed, for Todorov, what characterizes fantastic literature is a fundamental indeterminacy in reading: the fantastic is defined “by the ambiguous perception which the reader has of the narrated events” (32, my emphasis). The reader in question, Todorov adds, is not any empirical, “real,” or “particular” reader but a “function” of reading implicit in the text (32). The ambiguous perception of the reader-function is “inscribed in the text with the same precision as are the movements of the characters” (32). In “Das Bettelweib,” the reader-function inscribed in the text includes two readings. On the one hand, the narrator’s reading suggests the supernatural and leans towards the “marvelous.” On the other, in the presence of their servant the married couple suppress such a reading of the noise as supernatural, or indeed as anything unsettling in any way, because they want still to be able to sell the castle: “der dringende Wunsch, das Schloß, es koste was es wolle, los zu werden, vermocht sie, das Entsetzen, das sie ergriff, in Gegenwart ihres Dieners zu unterdrücken”; they therefore rationalize the noise with an indifferent explanation: “und dem Vorfall irgend eine gleichgültige und zufällige Ursache, die sich entdecken lassen müsse, unterzuschieben” (13). The reader-function is thus structured as a hesitation, an indeterminacy, characteristic of the fantastic, between these two poles.

Furthermore, according to Todorov, the fantastic stems from a perception which produces the sensation that something happens but also the sensation of a radical uncertainty about the status of what is perceived. The fantastic reaction implies a “strange” event but the strange event is not in itself what makes the fantastic. What characterizes the fantastic is the reaction to the event, which is one of inconclusion and hesitation which renders the event ungraspable: “the reaction makes it impossible to grasp the action... If the insistence on the perception is too strong, the object is no longer perceived” (Todorov 103). In “Das Bettelweib von Locarno” the initial element of the fantastic development — the beggarwoman’s body — disappears. Its “returns” in the form of noises are inconceivable or ungraspable (unbegreiflich). The first “strange event” can no longer be grasped, even the repeated subsequent noises can no longer be grasped: “der Marquis, der den Degen ergriffen: wer das ruft, und da ihm niemand antwortet... nach allen Richtungen die Luft durchhaut” (17); noises of movement evoke a body but there is not one:
«das entsetzliche Geräusch läßt sich wieder hören ... grad als ob ein Mensch auf ihn eingeschritten käme» (16). Instead, the perception grasps the couple: «das Entsetzen, das sie ergriff» (13).

As with Todorov’s fantastic, in «Bettelweib von Locarno» what happened is uncertain, but not uncertain is the fact that the event, «it», happened because when «it» happens, «it» produces a reaction. As Emil Staiger wrote: «es wird meist nicht gefragt: Was geschieht jetzt? sondern: Wenn das geschieht, was tut oder fühlt einer dann?» (117). Like Todorov, Staiger emphasizes the reaction and not the event itself because before one can ask what happens, it is necessary that something indeterminant have happened. The ungraspability of an event lies in the fact that an event occurs prior to asking what that event is. Once what the event is has been determined, the event as event no longer is. Although the event can be analyzed and expressed by a content, thereby answering the question «what happens?», the occurrence of the event as such is not grasplable and it is this ungraspability to which one bears witness in the occurrence of an event. The feeling that this entails, Lyotard notes, «has been baptized or re-baptized, between the seventeenth and eighteenth European century, by the name sublime» (Inhuman 105). Indeed, the perception of the repeated, inconceivable noise in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» gives rise to a feeling of shock akin to the sublime feeling: «Aber wie erschüttert war er, als er in der Tat, mit dem Schlage der Geisterstunde, das unbegreifliche Geräusch wahrnahm» (11).

The noise (Geräusch) is not the only ungraspable thing in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno»; a rumor (Gerücht) rose up (erhob sich) under the Marquis’ own house-servants: «dargestalt, da sich unter seinem eigenen Hausgesinde, befremdend und unbegreiflich, das Gerücht erhob, daß es in dem Zimmer, zur Mitternachtsstunde, umgehe, er, um es mit einem entscheidenden Verfahren niederzuschlagen, beschloß, die Sache ... zu untersuchen» (9). «Befremdend» and «unbegreiflich» clearly modify «das [sich erhebende] Gerücht» since «befremdend und unbegreiflich» are situated in the subordinate clause «da sich unter seinem eigenen Hausgesinde, befremdend und unbegreiflich, das Gerücht erhob.» In this sense, the fact of the rising up of the Gerücht is that which is «befremdend und unbegreiflich.» However «befremdend» and «unbegreiflich» implicitly also modify the «es» (es) in «daß es in dem Zimmer, zu Mitternachtsstunde, umgehe.» This «es» refers to the noise, whereby «es» is the «unbegreifliche und gespenstartige Geräusch.» In this case, it would be the spooky noise (es gebe unm) which is «befremdend und unbegreiflich,» and not the rumor. The point, therefore, is that «befremdend und unbegreiflich» has a double reference: «das [sich erhebende] Gerücht» as well as the rising «Geräusch.» The Marquis wants, «es ... niederzuschlagen,»
i.e., the rumor and the noise. The rumor (Gerücht) and «it» («das Geräusch») are syntactically connected because their uprising is «befremdend und unbegreiflich.»

«Gerücht» and «Geräusch» are not only connected syntactically by «befremdend» and «unbegreiflich» and by the third person neuter pronoun «es,» they are also both linked by the verb sich erheben, etymologically linked to the sublime. This verb appears three times in the text: «Die Frau, da sie sich erhob» (3); «das Gerücht erhob sich» (9); and «aber wie erschüttert war er, als er in der Tat, mit dem Schlage der Geisterstunde, das unbegreifliche Geräusch wahrmnahm; es war, als ob ein Mensch sich von Stroh, das unter ihm knisterte, erhob ... und ... unter Geseufz und Geröchel niedersank» (11). Through the verb «sich erheben» the woman, the rumor and the noise are connected – and linked to the sublime. Not only is there an etymological connection between the rising up of the woman, rumor, noise («sich erheben») and the sublime (das Erhabene), but moreover the event of the rising up – as «befremdend» and «unbegreiflich» – approaches the basic structure of the sublime. Their happening («sich erheben») is what is strange and inconceivable. When the verb sich erheben appears in connection with the Geräusch, the noise is posited («unter ihm knisterte») but the presence of what makes the noise – the person, the straw – is purely hypothetical (they are «there» only by the «als ob ... »). The «unbegreifliche Geräusch» (the noise «of» rustling straw) only indicates the rising up of a «Mensch» that is not there. Just as the sublime is the anxiety provoked by negative presentation, i.e., by an uncertainty involved in the taking place of an occurrence, both the Gerücht and the Geräusch are presented as events linked to the sublime – i.e., as the arising of that which imagination cannot grasp.

In Kant’s analysis, the feeling of the sublime coincides with a collapse of the subject, stemming from imagination’s simultaneous ability to «hear» and inability to understand the voice of reason (KdU 98). In Das Bettelweib von Locarno the result of an inconceivable noise is the collapse of a subject, the Marquis, and of its castle. Both are shattered: the Marquis – «wie erschüttert war er» (11); the house – «in Schutt und Trümmern» (1). Just as the woman, the noise and the rumor were linked through the signifier erhob in the verb sich erheben, the breakdown of the Marquis is linked to that of the castle through the punning stem schutt – «Stroh, das man ihr unterschüttete» (1) – that shakes down both. The collapse of the subject is that of his position of authority as one who gives orders. Whereas in the story’s opening paragraph the Marquis orders the old woman to cross over the room, a command which she obeys before dying, in the rest of the text it is the noise that commands the Marquis’s attention. The story begins with the Marquis’ arbitrary, yet seem-
ingly absolute, order: «Der Marchese, der ... zufällig in das Zimmer trat ... befaßl der Frau unwillig ... aufzustehen, und sich hinter den Ofen zu verfügen. ... [D]ie Frau ... ging ... wie es vorgeschrieben war, über das Zimmer» (2–3). The verb prescribing the woman’s movement (sich zu verfügen) refers at the same time to a spatial move and to a position of authority. Sich verfügen means «to move» and verfügen über means «to have authority over.» Ordering the woman to go behind the stove, the Marquis assumes absolute authority over her. Commanding («befählt») is a sort of prescribing («vorgeschrieben»). Prescription is not, however, law.99 Thereafter, however, the Marquis’ command and the woman’s obedience are inverted chiasmatically; respectively, they become the «law» of that noise associated with the woman’s return and the obligation of the Marquis. The Gesetz of the noise, we shall see, stems from the fact that it is an «entsetzliches Geräusch» (16), that it provokes «Entsetzen» (13, 19). Both «law» and «obligation» are more fundamental than «commands» or «obedience.» What changes in this inversion is not only who is in what position, but also, the terms at stake: obedience is not obligation; a command, not a law. More than just inverted, the terms are re-inscribed.20

Furthermore, the structure of this inversion and re-inscription coincides with that of the relation between rising and falling in Kleist’s Das Bettelweib von Locarno as well as in Kant’s «Analytik des Erhabenen.» In «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» the line drawn by the «alte kranke Frau» is constituted by her repeated rising and falling: «Die Frau, da sie sich erhob, glitschte mit der Krücke auf dem glatten Boden aus ..., dergestalt, daß sie zwar noch mit unsäglicher Mühe aufstand und ... niedersank» (3). Her movement is one across, über, at the same time as it ends in her sinking down. Her getting up alternates with her falling down. This alternation echoes how Kant describes the feeling of the Erhabenen. In Kant, the subject is caught in an oscillation between rising and falling and also between trying to forge a passage from the sensible to the supersensible and not being able to. Imagination moves simultaneously in two directions: «Das Überschwengliche für die Einbildungskraft ... ist gleichsam ein Abgrund» (KdU 103). This rising (über) and falling (ab) of imagination in the sublime feeling is akin to that impossible passage the subject nonetheless tries to forge. No passage across the gulf (Kluft) separating the sensible from the supersensible is possible («kein Übergang ist möglich» [11]).

Similarly, in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» the rising and falling motion of the beggarwoman passing across the room and retraced by the noise etches the faultline that produces the breakdown of the house and of the Marquis. However, while Kant maintains the dead-end nature of the crossover from
the sensible to the supersensible («kein Übergang ist möglich»), in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» the old woman does go across the room: «dargestellt, daß sie ... aufstand und quer ... über das Zimmer ging» (3). What is the nature of this «going over»? It is akin to that death which Kleist bespoke in his letter to Rühle von Lilienstern: «läßt uns etwas Gutes tun, und dabei sterben! Einen der Millionen Tode, die wir schon gestorben sind, und noch sterben werden. Es ist, als ob wir aus einem Zimmer in das andere gehen» (768). While crossing the room the woman goes «beyond» life, «niedersank und verschwand,» marking the movement from this room to one of another order. The old woman crossing over the room would pass an absolute border, that between «life» and «death.» Thus, the «vernehmliche Schritten» of the noise after her death resonate as *pas au-delà.*

For the movement «beyond» the room situates repeatedly the «beyond» in the room: the noise/ghost remains in the room. Although something goes «over there,» something yet stays «here,» in the corner of the room. Drawing the abstract line across the room, the old woman rises up (erhob sich), stands up (aufstand), and goes across the room «mit unsäglicher Mühe» (3), an effort which «unsayably» bespeaks the impossibility or the inadequacy of the subject at «going over» the abyss between «here» and «beyond,» between the sensible and the supersensible. The verbs describing her movement tell of an alternation between *aufsteigen* and *niedersinken* (that continues when the Marquis, «um es ... niederzuschlagen,» «ließ sein Bett ... aufschlagen» [9, 10]). The «effort» of the beggarwoman going across the room is that of an impossible passage, or as Kant puts it, «ein Bestreben zum Fortschritte ins Unendliche» (*KdU* 94, my emphases). Thus, of both Kant and Kleist's text, one can say that the Übergang is at the same time the Untergang, that is, *Aufstand* or *Erhebung* into a beyond is at the same time sinking down into the Abgrund.

In fact, rising movements (*sich erheben, übergehen, aufstehen, aufgeben*) remain anchored in the text by the sixteen-times repeated verbal prefix or preposition *unter: «unterschüttete»* (1), «unter» (3), «unterzubringen» (5), «herunter,» «unter» (6), «unter,» «untersuchen» (9), «unter,» «unter» (11), «herunter,» «Untersuchung,» «unterwerfen» (12), «unterdrücken,» «unterzuschieben» (13), «unterhalten» (15) and «unter» (16). The «Sache ... zu untersuchen» is never to touch ground, never «der Sache auf den Grund zu kommen» (14). Moreover, «das entsetzliche Geräusch» (16) unseats and upsets the couple who were said to «setzen sich» and try, «sich ... zu unterhalten» (15). Thus, the effort, the «Entsetzen, das sie ergriff, ... zu unterdrücken,» is merely to end with the «Marchese, von Entsetzen überreizt» (19). This noise therefore *entsetzt,* indeed *absetzt,* by an *Absetzung* or deposition that is
retribution for the Marquis’s initial injustice toward the old woman while he «seine Büchse abzusetzen pflegte» (2). From «Büchse abzusetzen,» the Marquis, «Kerze» in hand, will «in Flammen aufgehen.»

This deposing and dispossessing of the Marquis is the Entsatz, so to speak, produced by that noise which entsetzt.22 Telling of a removal of status and an anti-position, «entsetzliches Geräusch» or «Entsetzen» operates as the story’s Gesetz or moral by which the Marquis is repeatedly arraigned to a hearing («hört»), «hält» (13, 16]) in the tribunal-like «engerichteten Zimmer» of his «gehörig[en] Schloß.» Here, he presumes to be judge, and «es ... niederzuschlagen»; he concedes to this haunting or «entsetzliches» law; to this «Spuk,» some «Richtigkeit,» yet ends vainly slashing at it «nach allen Richtungen.» This haunted room as tribunal recalls Kant’s dramatization of conscience as courtroom when he questions whether man can seen as an «angeboren[er] Richter über sich selbst»: «Das Bewußtsein eines inneren Gerichtshofs im Menschen ... ist das Gewissen» (MdS 438). Such conscience «folgt ihm wie sein Schatten»; it is a voice that cannot but muted, for man can «nicht vermeiden, dann und wann zu sich selbst zu kommen oder zu erwachen, wo er alsbald die furchtbare Stimme desselben vernimmt. ... Sie zu hören, kann er doch nicht vermeiden» (MdS 438, Kant’s emphasis). Elsewhere, the moral law associated with this hearing repeatedly knocks down him who would place himself as maker of the law: «die reine Vernunft» «schlägt den Eigendünkel [arrogantia] gar nieder»; «als auch das moralische Gesetz den Eigendünnkel nieder»; «dieses Gesetz,» which «ihn sogar niederschlägt,» occasions «Achtung» (KpV 130, Kant’s emphasis). In Kant as in Kleist, whoever would usurp the enunciating position of the law is fundamentally displaced by the hearing of a law whose property it is to defy being placed, deduced or reduced.

Such an «entsetzliches Geräusch» even upsets the notion of opposition, of thesis and antithesis, of Satz and Gegensatz, which seems to structure the noise (and text) as either uncanny or marvelous. For of the four times that the noise is mentioned, the second and third time set up the two «opposed» readings of it: «das unbegreifliche Geräusch» stresses its uncanny aspect, whereas «dasselbe unbegreifliche, gespenstartige Geräusch» shifts the stress toward the marvelous. If the first mention is without adjective, «mit einem Geräusch» (6), the final mention, «das entsetzliche Geräusch,» unsettles the binarily-opposed second and third readings insofar as, lexically and thematically, this «entsetzliche» noise functions as a negation of (op)position, as anti-position.23

That Kleist’s text works off binary thinking, i.e., thinking structured by binary pairings or oppositions (sensible/supersensible, falling/rising, mor-
tality/spirituality), becomes absolutely clear when one pays attention to the high number of pairings or doublings that function in the text. There are nineteen pairings in this three-page text: «Schutt und Trümmern» (1); «hohen und weitläufigen» (1); «Stöhnen und Ächzen» (3); «niedersank und verschied» (3); «Krieg und Mißwachs» (4); «obenerwähnten, leerstehenden» (5); «schön und prächtig» (5); «verstört und bleich» (6); «hoch und teuer» (6); «langsam und gebrechlich» (6); «Stöhnen und Ächzen» (6); «befremdend und unbegreiflich» (9); «Geseufz und Gerächel» (11); «scheuen und ungewissen» (12); «verriegelt, versicherte» (12); «unbegreifliche, gespenstartige» (13); «gleichgültige und zufällige» (13); «Kopf und Beine» (15); «knurrend und belend» (16). There are also many structural doublings à distance where characters other than the beggarwoman-noise pair are described doing the same things with the same words at different moments, e.g.: «als der Ritter ... herunter kam ... versicherte, daß es ...» (6) and «da [der Marquis] herunter kam ... [und] versicherte, daß es ...» (12); or, between the knight, «... ließ er anspannen, empfahl sich und reiste ab» (8), and the Marquise, «läßt sie anspannen, entschlossen ... abzufahren» (17).²⁴ On the one hand, these pairings dramatize the doubleness of a world consisting of the physical and metaphysical, sensible and intelligible, etc.; indeed, in such a one as «dasselbe unbegreifliche, gespenstartige Geräusch» the decisive opposition of the uncannily rationalistic versus marvelously supernatural appears. Yet, on the other, most of the pairs entail coupling in the sense not of opposed thesis and antithesis but of doubling by supplementarity and contiguity.²⁵

Placed within a text which so readily gives itself to two opposed readings (uncanny or marvelous), these systematic pairings call into question whether binary oppositions (physical vs metaphysical) are in fact separate and different, not themselves related in the same supplemental, contiguous way that, say, «Stöhnen und Ächzen» or «Geseufz und Gerächel» are. Even «dasselbe unbegreifliche, gespenstartige Geräusch,» while referring to the previous time the noise was heard, may also ironically suggest that the pair comes to dasselbe. The fact that nineteen pairings (sixteen joined by «und») and numerous other doublings appear in a twenty sentence text testifies to an insistence upon doubleness yet also to two ways of thinking opposition: i) there are really different poles; and/or, ii) such poles are mere structural, equivalent, effects of some doubling caesura. The notion of binary opposition, such as supernatural/natural is an effect of the third, where the third term is, grammatically and rhetorically, the caesura, i.e., the und in sixteen of them, the comma in the other three. Even the beggarwoman and the noise which doubles her syntactically, lexically and thematically form a couple, a couple that may, on the one hand, be seen as composed by a pairing whose principle
is sameness or neutrality, insofar as "das Bettelweib" and "das Geräusch" are both neuter. On the other, however, this «pair» may be seen as organized by a principle of gender opposition insofar as "die sich bettelnd[e],» «alte, kranke Frau» is feminine whereas the general «jemand» associated with the noise by the Marquis is grammatically masculine. These two respective pairings (one of a kind of repetitive doubling, the other of a sort of difference) themselves form a pair whose nature one hesitates to name, yet whose functional caesura, in this story, is death (of the beggarwoman).26

The couple of the Marquis and the Marquise, the Ehepaar itself, can be seen as the paradigmatic figure of all these binary pairs. The term Ehepaar is used twice in the story (6, 15); the couple ends in separation, the end of the «Ehepaar» being typographically introduced by the split between «Ehe» and «paar» through the use of the punning conjunction «ehe»: «Aber ehe sie» (18) has time to flee the castle, the Marquise sees it go up in flames that consume her husband, thus separating the couple or paar joined in Ehe, and parity in general.27

What comes between the Ehepaar so as to prepare this separation? It would seem to be the «noise,» yet a closer «look» shows that it is the dog. Prior to the fifth and final witnessing of the sound crossing the room, the couple takes the dog with them into the room: «dergestalt, daß beide, ohne sich bestimmt zu erklären, vielmeflt in der unwillkürlichen Absicht, außer sich selbst noch etwas Drittes, Lebendiges, bei sich zu haben, den Hund mit sich in das Zimmer nahmen» (14). At the previous witnessing of the sound, the couple had taken a servant («samt einem treuen Bedienten, den sie mitgenommen hatten» [13]), whose presence, together with the couple's wish to sell the castle, motivated the couple to rationalize the noise and assign it a natural cause.

The dog which the couple «nahmen» the fifth time links and severs. As object of the verb «nahmen» (14), it joins with the previous three perceptions of the noise: «vernehmliche» (6), «wahrnahm» (11), and «mitgenommen» (13). Yet the dog represents a break in this chain of perceptions; it is even «von der Kette losgelassen» (14). The dog disjoins the couple; indeed, the sighting of the dog on the one hand makes the Marquise flee the room and have herself driven madly out of the castle, although she does take the time to pack some things, and, on the other, the Marquis torch his castle and himself with it:

Drauf, in dem Augenblick der Mitternacht, läßt sich das entsetzliche Geräusch wieder hören: jemand, den kein Mensch mit Augen sehen kann, hebt sich, auf Krücken, im Zimmerwinkel empor; man hört das Stroh, das unter ihm rauscht; und mit dem ersten Schritt: tapp! tapp! erwacht der Hund, hebt sich plötzlich, die Ohren spitzend, vom Boden empor, und knurrrend und bellend, grad als ob ein Mensch auf ihn
Ghost Stories

243

eingeschritten käme, rückwärts gegen den Ofen weicht er aus. Bei diesem Anblick stürzt die Marquise ... aus dem Zimmer. (15–16)

The present tense (sentences 14 through 18 in the twenty-sentence text) may give the illusion of the ghostly presence, but the catalyst for the separation of the couple is evidently the Hund. The dog is lexically the visual double of the non-visual «entsetzliche» noise: it «hebt sich ... empor» just as the invisible noise/»jemand» «hebt sich ... empor.»

Since the «jemand» (noise/»ghost») cannot by definition be seen but can only be heard, what is seen here (»Bei diesem Anblick«) is therefore only the dog. The Anblick of the dog separates the married couple, for it makes the Marquise leave the room (»... stürzt die Marquise ... aus dem Zimmer« [17]) so as to leave the castle (»aus dem Tore herausgerasselt« [18]), whereas it makes the Marquis stay, go crazy and torch his castle (»während der Marquis ... gleich einem Rasenden ... die Luft durchhaut. ... Der Marchese ... hatte eine Kerze genommen, und das [Schloß] ... angestekckt« [17, 19]). The sight of the dog thus disjoins the Ebepaar (hence, male from female, supernatural from natural, marvelous from uncanny, intelligible from sensible).

If at the diegetic level of the story the presence of the dog is stated to be an accident (»Am Abend des dritten Tages, ... fand sich zufällig der Haushund, den man von der Kette losgelassen hatte, vor der Tür ... eins« [14]), structurally the presence of the dog is not accidental. Rather, appearing the evening «des dritten Tages,» the dog functions as a necessary «third,» as «etwas Drittes» (14). The «Hund, Kopf und Beine zusammen» is thus poetically in tune with the caesura-like third – i.e., the «und» – while it also echoes another «third,» a Kantian «third» which is also necessary, «Nun ist klar, daß es ein Drittes geben müsse» (KvB 177), and which also takes the form of a dog in Kant’s definition of schematism.

The example of the dog introduces the definition of schematism:

Der Begriff vom Hunde bedeutet eine Regel, nach welcher meine Einbildungskraft die Gestalt eines vierfüßigen Tieres allegemein verzeichnen kann, ohne auf irgend-eine einzige besondere Gestalt, die mir die Erfahrung darbietet, oder auch ein jedes mögliche Bild, was ich in concreto darstellen kann, eingeschränkt zu sein. Dieser Schematismus unseres Verstandes, in Ansehung der Erscheinungen und ihrer bloßen Form, ist eine verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele, deren wahre Handgriffe wir der Natur schwerlich jemals abraten, und sie unverdeckt vor Augen legen werden. (KvB 180–81)

How exactly the schema works is secret, hidden from the eyes, yet it is thanks to it that any understanding whatsoever «in Ansehung» of appearances (content) and mere form is possible. Thanks to the rule of the dog, the concept of
the dog matches up with any real dog that I happen to perceive. The rule allows the Bild to be subsumed under the Begriff. This rule is the schema. The «Schema ... bedeutet eine Regel»; «das Schema der Einbildungskraft [ist] eine Regel der Bestimmung unserer Anschauung, gemäß einem gewissen allgemeinen Begriffe» (KvB 180). To condense: the schema is a rule, a «Regel der Bestimmung,» which makes something sensed (Kant’s German privileges the visual, «Anschauung») accord (bestimmen) with the concept of it.

If the dog in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» functions as a third between the inconceivable and the invisible, and by extension between all the other pairings in Kleist’s story, it is because Kleist’s dog has the function which Kant’s dog exemplifies, namely the «schema.» For the dog would be that through which the Marquise and Marquis see, «[b]ei diesem Anblick,» the «etwas, das dem Blick unsichtbar gewesen [ist]» (6). They thus see that they cannot see this «etwas,» the «what» that nonetheless is heard. Such is how the text emphasizes sight. The first lines, «Am Fuße der Alpen ... befand sich ein altes, einem Marchese gehöriges Schloß, das man jetzt ... in Schutt und Trümmern liegen sieht» (1), introduce sight and, subtly, hearing and what produces sound: «gehöriges» from hören (Duden 225); «Fuße» prepares the «vernehmliche Schritten» (6). The noise of the something «dem Blick unsichtbar,» occurs in the «Augenblick» (16) of midnight, produces «ungewissen Blicken» (12) about that which «kein Mensch mit Augen sehen kann» (16). It is only «[b]ei dem Anblick» of the dog that the Marquise attains a mediated vision, and thus decides «augenblicklich» (17) to leave. Thus, the dog and the Anblick of it are decisive in the text. In this regard, the «Absicht» suggested as not arbitrary for why the couple takes the dog into the room begins to make sense. For the narrator intervenes to suppose that they take the dog, «vielleicht in der unwillkürlichen Absicht, außer sich selbst noch etwas Drittes ... bei sich zu haben» (14). If not arbitrary «vielleicht» leaves uncertainty — then perhaps the «Absicht» recognizes a need. If this «Absicht» — to have «etwas Drittes» — is necessary, it is because this mediating «Drittes» makes sight possible; thus, only mediated sight is possible.

For sight only matches understanding if an image accords with its concept by means of the schema. Indeed, this is why the couple in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» take the dog «ohne sich bestimmt zu erklären» (14): as pair, «beide» are without the Bestimmung bespoken by Kant as the result of the schema. Lacking accord, they therefore must take the dog in the «vielleicht unwillkürlichen Absicht» because the dog — the object seen «bei diesem Anblick» — makes the invisible accord with the inconceivable, the «unsichtbare etwas» with the «unbegreiflichen Geräusch.» A spatial separation between the couple is emphasized by the fact that the husband and wife «setzen sich ...
jeder auf sein Bett» (15). The text leaves us guessing as to where these two beds are in the room, yet each «Bett» itself is synecdochally charged with its haunting double, the «Bettelweib» in the title and final sentence; for given Kleist's tonal poetics, we cannot be deaf, in the signifier «Bett» to the text's earlier play with «bettelnd» and «gebetet» (1). The text does however precisely locate the dog as mediating figure in the room, for «der Hund legt sich ... in der Mitte des Zimmers nieder» (15). Midway on the path travelled first by the beggarwoman and then by the noise, figuratively between this world and the world hereafter (hence, between the various pairings), the dog thus introduces the schema-function (mediational third) between the inconceivable and invisible noise, and by extension in the Ehepaar, between the marquis and the marquise; and it does so in terms of vision (their Absicht).

Just as the dog functions as a mediating «Drittes» in Kleist, so does the «Schema» work as «ein Drittes» in Kant:

Nun ist klar, daß es ein Drittes geben müsse, was einerseits mit der Kategorie [i.e., Begriff], andererseits mit der Erscheinung in Gleichartigkeit stehen muß, und die Anwendung der ersteren auf die letzte möglich macht. Diese vermittelnde Vorstellung muß ... einerseits intellektuell, andererseits sinnlich sein. Eine solche ist das transzendentale Schema. (KrV B 177)

As Vorstellung, this third mediates between the intelligible and the sensible, Begriff and Bild: «Diese Vorstellung nun von einem allgemeinen Verfahren der Einbildungskraft, einem Begriff sein Bild zu verschaffen, nenne ich das Schema zu diesem Begriffe» (B 180). No picture accords with a concept, no signifier with a signified, unless there is a schema. «In der Tat,» writes Kant, «liegen unseren reinen sinnlichen Begriffen nicht Bilder der Gegenstände, sondern Schemate zum Grunde.» For, Kant continues, an object in experience or image of the object never reaches the empirical concept, «sondern dieser [Begriff] bezieht sich jederzeit unmittelbar auf das Schema der Einbildungskraft, als eine Regel ...» (KrV B 180). In a way that echoes Kant's description of the split between the concept and the image, the tension in Kleist's text stems from a similar split: there is indeed something in Kleist's story that refers to the conceptual, as suggested by the «unbegreifliche» noise, and echoed by «ergriff» (13) and «ergriffen» (17)28; and something referring to the pictural (the «dem Blick unsichtbar» something). By the prefix «un» each has a negative relation to its stem. What creates tension in the story is this split between the concept («behind» the noise) and the image presenting it. Just as in Kant the schema (exemplified by the dog) is the reason or Grund that a concept corresponds to its picture, in Kleist's text, the Ehepaar, «um der Sache auf den Grund zu kommen,» lets in the «Haushund,» the «etwas Drittes.» The dog that turns up «zufällig» is not «unwillkürlich» for «Ab-
Thomas Dutoit

sicht.» It mediates between the couple, between the supernatural and the natural, the intelligible and the sensible. In Kleist as in Kant, to come to the «Grund» of what one is trying to grasp, the schema is needed, a schema that in Kant as in Kleist is exemplified by the «Hund,» by the figure of «etwas Drittes.»

In the «Anblick» of the dog is the view of the difference — or medium — between Begriff and Bild, or between what in Kleist is «unbegreiflich» and what is «unsichtbar.» What Kleist «represents» is not a pure intelligible conceptual, nor is it a pure picture (what critics call a Spukerscheinung). Rather, he more modestly represents the limit which is the condition of the possibility of these metaphysical-physical oppositions, their rule. The schema is that without which there is neither concept nor picture, neither metaphysical nor physical, neither marvelous nor uncanny. Kleist or Kant's dog — in short, the schema — is fantastic in the sense bespoke by Todorov, namely that moment before the formation of oppositions that themselves are the after effects of it.

In this sense, the schema shares the essential feature which Erdichtung had. Although the schema belongs to high philosophical discourse whereas Erdichtung is relegated to the low subgenres such as wives' tales, the schema and Erdichtung both are the only way to mediate between the non-presentable «spiritual» realm of conceptual intelligibility and the representational «living» world of apparent sensations. Such is the link between the pre-critical and the critical Kant, between him «who was interested in Swedenborg, [and] the thinker of the transcendental imagination and thus of all the conceptual thirds which the fantastic introduces between the sensible and the intelligible, so many places favorable to spectrality» (Derrida Spectres 227).

Given the relation I have analyzed between Geist in Kant's Träume eines Geistersbers and the sublime in his «Analytik des Erhabenen,» it should not be surprising that the noises linked to the sublime in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» are connected to ghosts. While Kant bans Geist from philosophy only to have its structural characteristic of negative presentation «return» in the aesthetic philosophy of the «Analytic of the Sublime,» Kleist apparently «presents» in fiction ghosts and ghostly sounds, rising up (sich erheben) through negative presentation in «Das Bettelweib von Locarno,» but what rises up, the Erhabene, is something akin to the sublime. Just as Geist haunts the sublime in Kant, the sublime seems to be the ghost in Kleist's story. Just as negative presentation in Kant's articulation of Geist and of the sublime problematizes the opposition (Geist/sublime, fiction/philosophy, low/high) and just as negative perception in Todorov disturbs genre distinctions (the fantastic, a popular culture phenomenon, comes to characterize all literature),
in a parallel way Kleist's «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» partakes in «popular» culture (as «ghost story») and at the same time in aesthetic philosophy (as the sublime). «Staging» hypothetical ghosts and ghostly sounds, Kleist's text uncovers (in the figure of the «third») the condition of possibility of binary thinking, that is, the condition of possibility of the oppositions that it, like the fantastic, upsets.31

Notes

1 Many nineteenth century Kantians saw Kant's Träume eines Geistersebers (1766) as what made possible his critical writings, starting with his inaugural dissertation Von der Form der Sinnen- und Verstandswelt und ihren Gründen in 1770 and continued in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Schopenhauer called Kant's Träume eines Geistersebers erläutert durch die Träume der Metaphysik the «Vorhergeträumte» of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Valhinger saw Kant's «transcendental subject» as unmistakably linked to Swedenborg's «spiritual Ego» (Valhinger 512–13). Others, such as von Lind, Heinze, Schurman, Du Prel, Hallier, Güttler, and Edmunds, added to this interpretation (see Frank Sewall's Introduction to Dreams of a Spirit-seer and Paul Carus's on Kant's Prolegomena [Carus 188–92]). Monique David-Ménard, in La Folie dans la raison pure. Kant lecteur de Swedenborg (1991), confirms these views.

2 «The fantastic implies ... a kind of reading, which we may ... define negatively» (Todorov 32).

3 The «third genre» relevant to any discussion of genre is that, broached by Plato in the Timaeus, of khora; it belongs to a «third genre» (triton genos) which is neither «intelligible» nor «sensible» (52a, 48c). On this, see Jacques Derrida’s Khora.

4 «Das Bettelweib» exemplifies how, according to Deleuze and Guattari, Kleist’s «forms and persons are only appearances produced by the displacement of a center of gravity on an abstract line» (268).

5 Although the sublime received many formulations in the eighteenth century, not only by many different authors, but also by Kant alone throughout his oeuvre, it has been Kant's articulation in his «Analytic of the Sublime» of a negative presentation that has been associated with Kleist’s aesthetic. In Hamacher's «Das Beben der Darstellung,» see the section entitled «Kleist mit Kant — negative Darstellung» for the best reading of Kleist in terms of the sublime. Other excellent readings of the sublime in Kleist are Bernhard Greiner’s «Die Wende in der Kunst — Kleist mit Kant,» and Christian Begemann’s «Brentano und Kleist vor Friedrichs Mond am Meer.» Ludwig Muth links Kant and Kleist in terms of the Kritik der Urteilskraft, but in terms of its 2nd part, the «Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft,» Kleist mit Kant: Versuch einer neuen Interpretation.

6 I cite «Das Bettelweib von Locarno,» arguably a prose poem, by sentence number, in accordance with the precedent established by Emil Staiger. All emphases are mine.

7 After Davids's analysis, Helmuth Himmel argued that in «Das Bettelweib,» «Kleist ... benutzt die mehrfache Wiederkehr einer Spukerscheinung dazu, eine Technik der sprachlichen Wiederholung anzuwenden, wie wir sie in ausgeführter Form in neuerer Zeit an Paul Celans Todesfuge beobachten konnten» (Himmel 191). Given how «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» insists upon the invisibility of the concept, on how the Blick fails to see, one could conclude
that it is tones, noises and a distortion of the verb ver-sügen (2) that orchestrate Kleist's Bil-
derstürmer (216), his destruction of the visible order of representation. That Kleist put the
accent on tone and not image is in keeping with his poetics. In the well known letter to Marie
von Kleist from the summer of 1811, Kleist rooted all art in music (ich betrachte [die Musik]
as die Wurzel ... aller übrigen [Künsten]) contrasting explicitly with Goethe's Farbenlehre
(«einen Dichter ... der all seine Gedanken über die Kunst, die er übt, auf Farben bezogen
hat»). All of Kleist's «Dichtkunst» is «auf Töne bezogen» (875). Many critics have analyzed
tonality in Kleist. See Kluckholn (812) and Hermino Schmidt's chapter «Kleist und Musik,»
ot to mention Deleuze and Guattari who note: «All of Kleist's work is traversed by a ...
musical machine invoked against painting or the «picture»» (265). The recent work on noise in
Kleist by Bente Menke is indispensable.

8 Frank Sewall, in his note on the translation, Dreams of a Spirit-seer, Illustrated by the
Dreams of Metaphysics (DS), maintains that Kant was delving in spirits and not ghosts. He
posits that Geisterseher in Kant's title should be translated as «spirit-seer,» not as «ghost-
seer»: «The common title, 'Dreams of a Ghost-Seen,' is not retained because it is a manifestly
false rendering of the term 'Geisterseher.' This means simply a seer of 'spirits,' not of
'ghosts.' (DS ii). Yet Kant did not exclude anything from being a Geist, certainly not
'ghosts.' Kant even writes, 'ich weiß nicht einmal, was das Wort Geist bedeutet' (TG 926).

Kant's sweeping of the philosophical stage and institutionalization of the fictional is, in 1766,
not irrelevant to the contemporaneous appearance of «Gothic» narratives, and ghost-stories
in particular. When Schopenhauer explicitly complemented Kant's Träume eines Geister-
sehers with his own Versuch über Geistersehen und was damit zusammenhängt (1850), the
philosophical stage was not only cluttered with but defined by the supernatural. He re-
corded a flurry of texts in English, French, and German on the general issue of «parapsy-
chology» that he, contrary to Kant, held to belong squarely at the center of the idealist phi-
losophical stage, which includes: Kieser's «Archiv für thier. Magn.» (263); physiological texts
by Treviranus, Peléquin, v. Helmont (263); «Geschichte der hellsehenden Auguste Müller»
(269); Dupontet Traité complet du Magnétisme (270); Szapary, «Ein Wort über anim. Magn.»
(282); Deleuze, Hist. cr. du magn. (1811) (282); J.C. Hennings «Von Geistern und Geisterse-
hern» (1780) (301); Walter Scott, On Demonology and Witchesraft (1812) (302); J. Wenzel's Un-
terhaltungen über die auffallendsten neusten Geistererscheinungen (1890) (307); and a journal
out of America, Spiritual Telegraph (1854) (315). Titles are as Schopenhauer lists them.

9 Crusius defines Geist: «ein Geist ist also eine Substanz, welche denken und wollen kann,
ober ein Geist ist eine Ideenfähige Substanz.» Moreover, Crusius argues, against those who
take «das Wort Geist in einer engern Bedeutung,» «daß man die Bedeutung des Wortes Geist
erweitere, und alle Ideenfähige Substanzen mit diesem Namens benenne» (841).

11 Kant gives Erdichtung more consideration in Träume eines Geistersehers than elsewhere, yet
he experimented with it in the notes to his Anthropologie (Reflexionen zur Anthropologie),
and it returns in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In the notes, erdichten is one of ten terms
that begins a section entitled «Neue Vorstellungen,» i.e., ways of inventing new images, such
as poetry, fantasy, dreaming, insanity, premonition, and madness for writing (Schrifttoll).
Erdichten is the ninth among ten subspecies that include «Entdecken,» «Erfinden,» «Erstel-
len,» «Erdenken,» «Dichten,» and «Lügen.» Placed between dichten and liegen, erdichten is
what does not differentiate the poeticized from the true: «the poeticized, not differentiated
from the true» (das Gedichtete nicht vom Wahren unterscheiden) (RzA 700).

In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant returned to Erdichtung to name that possibility
consisting both of crossing beyond the limit (Kreis) of experience, and remaining in that act
in a delusion of crossing such a limit. When one is beyond this limit, contradictions in
thought may «vermieden werden, wenn man seine Erdichtungen behutsam macht, ohne daß sie deswegen weniger Erdichtungen bleiben» (KrV A 4). The research of reason into the beyond can be careful, consistent and coherent, yet precisely that is merely a feature of what remains nonetheless an Erdichtung, i.e. what conceals the distinction between a fiction and the true. «Die Vernunft» would «unter Erdichtungen ... ersäufen» if the fiction of what Kant calls the «transzendentale Hypothese» is taken for true (KrV A 782). The «transcendental hypothesis» (KrV A 780) is an exact resume of Swedenborg’s positions that were analyzed in Träume eines Geistersehers.

13 Does this embarrassment persist when the «gegenwärtige Kritik der Urteilkraft,» identifying its occupation as finding an «eigentümliches Prinzip der [Urteilkraft],» admits to finding itself in «Verlegenheit» «in denjenigen Beurteilungen, die man ästhetisch nennt» «findet sich» «diese Verlegenheit wegen eines Princip» (KdU, Vorrede vii)?

14 Jemand is grammatically masculine although the gender of the hypothetical invisible person is not marked; it is proof that the Marquis does not ascribe the noise to the beggarwoman. The first time he hears it, he refers the noise to a grammatically masculine person («Mensch,» «ihn» (11)). For the Florentine knight, who, unlike the Marquis, knows nothing of the beggarwoman’s existence, the noise remains more indeterminate, seeming to stem from a grammatically neuter «etwas» (6).

15 Strictly speaking, in this text there is no narrator, but only what Käte Hamburger calls narrative function (Hamburger 113).

16 It is precisely because of this rupture that the criticism on the story is divided on this question of whether the Marquis ever links his feeling of horror to his arbitrarily rough treatment of the beggarwoman in the first paragraph. Peter Horn states that: «Entscheidend ist, daß der Marchese bis zum Schluß der Erzählung seine Schuld nicht greift – das hat Werlich gegen die Auffassung Conradys und Staigers ... zu recht geltend gemacht» (Horn 159, cf. Werlich 241).

17 If «Das Bettelweib» plays with such an opposition in order to undermine it by pointing to its «in-between,» it may not be a coincidence if the rich criticism on «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» throughout the twentieth century is itself divided along the lines of a similar binary opposition. The criticism is divided between formalists – e.g., Staiger, Himmel, Mehigan, who always state their disdain for the shallow, popular and trivial content of the story but exalt the formal excellence of Kleist (Staiger 116, 129) – and critics who focus precisely on this popular content – e.g., Werlich, Horn, Fischer, who always state the need to refer their minute analyses to the popular, to external social realities, such as revolutions and class struggles. Staiger prepares his formalist analysis by dismissing the content: «Man braucht den Inhalt nur ... zusammenzufassen, um zu erkennen, daß von Tiefinn hier nicht wohl die Rede sein kann» (116). He concludes: «Wir kommen zum Ergebnis: Was uns an «Bettelweib von Locarno» erschüttert, ist die unerbittlich durchgeführte dramatische Form an sich ... Der Stoff ist weiter nichts als eine Schauermärz» (129). Forty years later, Mehigan’s conclusions on pure form are similar: «the ghost’s presence ... stands for the pure form of the text in which structural form is at once textual substance or subject-matter» (Mehigan 197). Similar types of quotes but from the opposing point of view are in Werlich, Horn and Fischer. Rather than synthesize these views, I want to draw attention to how Kleist’s text dramatizes what makes the form-content opposition possible. Neither the supernatural (the «marvellous») nor the natural (the «uncanny») are affirmed in the text; rather, the text points at something between the two, between intelligible and sensible, metaphysical and physical, supernatural and natural, form and content, etc.

18 The rumor of the noise calls the Marquis to the room. As Lawrence Rickels recalls: «Gerücht (rumor) is linked etymologically to Ruff (call)»; «Gerücht, as a collective noun, signifies a
Such a relation between sich erheben and erhoben, or the Erhabene, may seem implausible to a native German speaker. It was, nonetheless, Kant who used the motif of the rising up of the soul (sich erheben) in contrast with the frailty of its nature to exemplify how the sacred law appears sublime (erhaben): «die Seele glaubt sich in dem Maße selbst zu erheben, als sie das heilige Gesetz über sich und ihre gebrechliche Natur erhoben sieht» (KpV 91–92). The contrast consists in the recognition of the frailty of the soul’s nature set against the idea of the sacrality of the law. A fragile soul is the precondition and prohibition of a conception of the unrepresentable.

In Kantian terms: «Die Imperativen selber aber, wenn sie bedingt sind, d.i. nicht den Willen schlechthin als Willen, sondern nur in Ansehung einer begehrten Wirkung bestimmen, ... sind zwar praktische Vorschriften aber keine Gesetze» (KpV 37). The moral law for Kant, Lyotard resums, «remains undeduced»; hence, «someone who decides the law instead of being its addressee cannot be a judge but is necessarily a criminal. And someone who submits to a law decided in this way can only be a victim» (Differend 122, 107). Usurping the law, the vorgeschriebene Befehl makes its addressee, the Marquis, a criminal, and the beggarwoman who submits to it, a victim.

Therefore, the relation is more complicated than is suggested by Margarete Landwehr’s analysis of the symmetry and «paralles between crime and punishment» (263). Although Jürgen Schröder and especially Peter Horn, like Landwehr, provide readings of the tale to which I am indebted in many ways, it would be misleading to say, as Landwehr implies they and other «critics» do, that they see a simple juncture between the initial scene and the subsequent scenes. Cf. Horn’s essay for the ghost story as parable of the moral law.

Cf. Maurice Blanchot’s Le pas au-delà, which could be translated both as The Step Beyond or The Not Beyond.

The prefix ent in «Entsetzen» or «entschlossen» (17) denotes reversal, negation or removal. Thus, when the Marquis is said to be «entschlossen, nach der Stadt abzufahren», being «entschlossen» ironically announces an un-closing, for «entschlossen» is roughly simultaneous to seeing the «Schloß» go up in flames (18). This opening of the «Schloß» (Schutt und Trümmer) reverses the effort to preserve the castle’s market value, i.e., when the Marquis «beschloß» to dispel the rumor of the haunted castle (9).

In the text now most associated with the uncanny, Hoffmann’s «Der Sandmann» (1816), to testify to «das Entsetzliche» («Etwas Entsetzliches ist in meinem Leben gerettet!») is also to fear being seen as a «Geisterseher» (3).

Before the letter «f» the prefix ent becomes emp. The intensifying prefix in empfehlen comes, however, from «in» and not from the negating ent, its homonym (Duden 156).

Staiger’s commentary on these «pairings» (he counts ten of them), though interesting, does not go far enough into what structures them: «Der Dichter bevorzugt den paarweisen Ausdruck. Doch die beiden Glieder ergänzen einander in der Regel nicht, sondern im zweiten wird nur der Inhalt des ersten wiederholt oder leicht variiert. Dies legt die Vermutung nahe, das Sinnlich-Intensive sei nicht so wichtig. Klein wähle das erste beste Wort, spüre dann, es reiche nicht aus, und füge rasch ein zweites hinzu» (117). Staiger astutely sees that the pairings are not oppositional in the sense of positive and negative, but he values them solely in formal terms, retaining a form (high art) and content (low art) opposition, and misses in the text what makes pairings possible in the first place.
Kleist's texts dramatize such pairings made by death, for e.g., Colino/Nicolo in «Der Findling» or Lisbeth/the Zigeunerin in «Michael Kohlhaas.» Elsewhere I explore how the «death» of Graf F.... in «Die Marquise von O. ...» separates him into the one who zeugt and the one who is überzeugt (Dutoit 56).

The only other usage of the word Ehepaar in Kleist's prose is in «Der neuere (glücklichere) Werther.» This anecdote is about one who, like the Marquis «müde seines Lebens» (19) in «Das Bettelweib,» tries to kill himself because he is «seines Lebens müde» (276). Whereas in «Das Bettelweib» the couple is separated seemingly by some inexplicable noise that drives the Marquis, «den Unglücklichen» (20), to self-destruction, in «Der neuere (glücklichere) Werther» it is Charles C...., discovered in the bed of his boss's wife by the «Ehepaar» returning home earlier than expected, who comes between the couple and separates them because his attempted suicide provokes the death by stroke of the husband.

Thus elsewhere Kleist foresees the Geist that awaits us at the end of our life: «es kann kein böser Geist sein, der an der Spitze der Welt steht; es ist ein bloß unbegreifener» (768).

On «etwas Drittes» as analogy for what is «unbegreiflich,» cf. the Anthropologie (A B 84, and Rostock ms.); on it in terms of «Dichtung,» cf. Nancy's Le Discours de la symbole (108). In «The Family Pet; or, The Human and the Animal,» Marc Shell shows how pets are mediational figures (148-75).

The «full-circle» ending of «Das Bettelweib von Locarno,» the number of events (5), the triangular room-corners (Zimmerwinkel), and the dog correspond, oddly enough, to the four examples which Kant uses to demonstrate his notion of the schema as the mediation between Begriff and Bild: 1) a «Zirkel»; 2) «fünf Punkte hintereinander.....» or the «Bild von der Zahl fünf»; 3) a «recht- oder schiefwinklige» «Triangel»; 4) a «Hund» (KrV B 176, 179, 180, 180, respectively). The five crossings of the room that are the story's constitutive events recall Kant's «....» Like Kant's circle, the story's title «Das Bettelweib von Locarno» is rounded out, as Himmel observes (192), by the last words of the text, «von welchem [Winkel], er das Bettelweib von Locarno hatte aufsehen zeigen» (20). The Marquis's end also comes full circle with that of the beggarwoman because, «auf die elendigste Weise bereits umgekommen,» his bones lie in that same Winkel just mentioned: «noch jetzt liegen, von den Landleuten zusammengetragen, seine weißen Gebeine in dem Winkel des Zimmers» (20). The corner is insisted upon, «Winkel» (2, 20), «Zimmerwinkel» (6, 16). Out of this same corner, «aus dem Winkel» (2), the beggarwoman's deathmarch began at the command of the Marquis; during it she, «auf gefährliche Weise,» «beschädigte .... das Kreuz» (3). His death, which is obviously also a «coming around» (umkommen), and his final resting place not only testify to a circle, but also, the «Weise» common to both is linked by the double reference to bones. His sacrum, his Kreuz, ends up in the corner for the os sacrum or hieron osteon is used to commemorate sacrifices. Meletius tells us: «the outermost bone of the lower back toward the fundament, is called the sacred bone; it is called this either because it is large, and the sacred bone is large; or because it potent, since it takes away suffering; or because the Hellenes customarily used it in the performance of sacred rites to their gods» (111, I would like to thank Derek Collins for this translation; cf. also Duden [387] and van Straten). Such blanched bones gathered by the «Landleuten» after the burning of the body and razing of his home allude to many literary/social traditions, from Telemaques's fear about Odysseus's whites bones unburied, to the Greek notion of ontologia or the gathering of bones after the burning of a body (The Bonegatherers is the title of a lost tragedy by Aeschylus), and to those noted by Frazier among «primitive» peoples for whom superstition is more important than economic considerations: burning a home in which someone died is the villagers' duty so as to ward off returning ghosts, and a body not receiving burial ceremonies is sure to be a
restless ghost (6ff.). In this story of a Kreuzhaus or afflicto domestica, the signifier Kreuz is traversed by its many homonyms: «kreuz und quer» refers to criss-crossing «Bewegungen, die sich wiederholen» (Grimm 2185) while the beggarwoman and noise’s movements are «quer» (3, 6, 11) across the spot where she hurt her «Kreuz» (3); «Kreuz» can mean an «Un terschrift» (Sanders 1028), and the Marquis’s bones are the counter-signature to the beggar woman’s «Kreuz.» Kreuz can also mean the sign placed on a house after its «gerichtlichen Verkauf» (Hoffmann 530), reminding us of the irony of the couple’s wish to sell «das Schloß, es koste was es wollte» (13).

This fantastic as difference would precede what Staiger in his essay on the story called the «pure form»: «Die reine Form bezwingt uns, derart, daß wir übernehmen, was ursprüng licher ist als alle Gegenstände der Erfahrung, nämlich die Struktur der Phantasie, die a priori jeden möglichen Gegenstand bestimmt» (129). The «structure of fantasy» however, implies a third between and prior to form-content. Kleist gives a radical reading of such «fantasy» in the story, his reading of Kant’s schema, that is echoed by Heidegger’s analysis of the «Schematism» chapter. Heidegger accents the schema as sign of permanent disjunction between Begriff and Bild («diese Unangemessenheit gehört ... gerade zum Schema Bild»; «Dieses Nichterreichene heißt zunächst: nicht adaquat darstellen» [Kant 98, 97]). All representation – as schema – only reiterates the fact that there is no non-fictional, true link between the concept and image, signified and signifier.

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